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<2>Abstract 
It is widely accepted that people with disabilities incur additional expenditures on transport, 
heating, equipment and other items. In this paper, we estimate the magnitude of these extra costs 
of living for adults with disabilities aged 50–65 across 15 countries of Europe using the SHARE 
data. Drawing on the Standard of Living approach of Zaidi and Burchardt (2005), we compare 
the incomes required by households with and without adults with disabilities to obtain an 
equivalent standard of living. We advance upon this research by drawing on the cross-nationally 
harmonized data of adults aged 50+ from the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE). The results suggest that there are substantial extra costs of disability in these 
countries, around 44 percent of income for a household with an adult reporting a work-related 
disability and somewhat less, 30 percent of income, for a household with an adult who receives 
disability benefits. Applying an equivalization scale based on these figures increases the overall 
poverty incidence rate, especially for households with disabled adult members. These findings 
thus have implications for analysing the entitlement and benefit levels for disability support 
programmes and for devising accurate poverty estimates concerning persons with disabilities. 
 
<2>Introduction   
 Households containing persons with disabilities experience many forms of extra costs 
that those without disabilities do not encounter. These costs include paying for aids and 
adaptations, charges for support services and assistance, higher fuel costs due to spending more 
time at home or needing to keep it warmer, additional costs for pharmaceutical drugs, higher 
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costs of food for special diets, and higher transport costs. These extra costs can be offset by 
social benefits, tax relief, independent living allowances and other policies and transfer payments 
that are made available to meet extra needs of persons with disabilities. However, prior research 
suggests that public support programmes do not do enough to account for the extra costs 
associated with a disability (Newacheck et al., 2004; Saunders, 2007; She and Livermore, 2007; 
Wilkinson-Meyers et al., 2010; Schimmel and Stapleton, 2012; Braithwaite and Mont, 2009; 
Morciano et al., 2012; Loyalka et al., 2014). Estimating the extra costs of disabilities that remain 
once these programmes are accounted for can thus form a ‘basis for devising eligibility and 
benefit levels for disability support programmes and in assessing the adequacy of supports’ 
(Mitra et al., 2017, 6). 
In this paper, we provide the first harmonized cross-national estimates of the extra costs 
of living associated with a disability, following the approach of Berthoud et al. (1993), which 
was extended by Zaidi and Burchardt (2005; 2009). Although studies of the extra costs of 
disabilities have been conducted in many countries, prior research has drawn on disparate 
datasets with varying indicators of disability and of standard of living, which make cross-
national comparisons difficult (see, Mitra et al., 2017 for a review of the recent literature). We 
advance upon this research by drawing on the ex-ante cross-nationally harmonized data of adults 
aged 50 and over from the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The 
objective of the research reported here is two-fold. First, we provide descriptive evidence of the 
extra costs of disability pooled across all countries, as well as according to individual countries 
and welfare state regimes. We find that the extra costs of disability are substantial and that even 
those who receive benefits on account of their disabilities require considerable additional income 
in order to achieve a suitable standard of living, a finding which has implications for the analysis 
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of disability-related decommodification as per Esping-Andersen (1990). Second, we examine the 
sensitivity of poverty measurement to the adjustment for the extra costs of disability and 
demonstrate that by ‘equivalising’ household incomes after accounting for needs arising due to 
disability, the poverty risks for people with disabilities are considerably higher. These findings 
thus have considerable implications for not just in the measurement of poverty across subgroups 
with and without disabilities but also in analysing the adequacy of social welfare programmes.  
<2>Background 
<3>The Standard of Living Approach 
The reason for investigating the extra costs involved with a disability is that people with 
disabilities are likely to experience a lower standard of living than their non-disabled 
counterparts with the same level of income as a result of the diversion of scarce resources to 
goods and services required because of the disability. This substitution in favour of disability-
related consumption items and away from items which improve the general standard of living 
arises out of the income constraint. Prior research shows there to be many ways to calculate the 
financial costs of disability (see, Berthoud, 1991; Zaidi and Burchardt, 2005; Mitra et al., 2017). 
Stapleton et al. (2008) review these approaches and view the ‘expenditure equivalence’ 
approach, or what we will refer to as the Standard of Living (SOL) approach, to be a most 
reliable method.  
The standard of living in the SOL approach can be assessed by an independent metric of 
material hardship such as the ability to make ends meet or the ownership of consumer durables. 
The extra costs are calculated by way of a regression-based approach that accounts for other 
potential sources of variation as the additional amount of income a household with a member with 
disabilities would need to achieve the same standard of living (e.g. the ability to make ends meet) 
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as an equivalent household without a member with a disability. The strengths of the SOL approach 
are that it does not require the direct measurement of expenditures on a basket of goods and 
services or rely on a subjective evaluation of the additional costs (Mitra et al., 2017). The SOL 
approach identifies the extra costs indirectly by examining how individuals can translate income 
into utility as measured by a standard of living. Cullinan et al. (2011) further observe that the SOL 
approach is ideally suited for large-scale micro data analysis as it is less likely to be vulnerable to 
adaptive response behaviour among those surveyed. 
A clear limitation of the SOL approach is that the results are sensitive to the measure of 
standard of living that is selected. The estimation results are also likely to vary according to the 
disability definition that is used. Mitra and colleagues (2017) identified 20 studies in 10 countries 
estimating the costs of disability but with heterogeneous estimates of the costs of disability. These 
authors further conclude that more quantitative evidence is needed, particularly rigorous research 
that uses internationally comparable data measuring disability and standard of living of persons 
with disabilities. The research reported in this paper is based on the cross-nationally harmonized 
SHARE data allowing application of the same standard of living, income and disability definitions 
across countries.  
We summarize recent literature using the SOL approach in Table 1. Despite the variation 
in the definitions and contexts of these studies, a consistent picture emerges of sizeable extra 
costs associated with disability. The results from the US study suggest greater costs than the 
European and Australian studies, but it is difficult to know to what extent this is due to 
methodological differences and to what extent to the higher level of co-payments for medical 
care and other care services in the US. For the other studies, estimates for medium-severity 
disability range from 18 to 62 per cent in developed countries. Research calculating the extra 
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costs of disability in developing countries, such as in Vietnam (Minh et al., 2015) and Cambodia 
(Palmer et al., 2016), report lower extra costs estimates than for the advanced economic 
countries.  
<Insert Table 1 near here> 
<Table head>Table 1: Some recent estimates of the extra costs of disability, using the standard 
of living or ‘expenditure equivalence’ approach 
Study Country and 
data source 
Population and 
disability definition 
Standard of living 
indicators 
Extra costs 
estimate 
Zaidi and 
Burchardt 
(2005) 
UK: 1996/7 
Family 
Resources 
Survey 
Household population;  
OPCS severity 
categories of disability 
Ownership of 
consumer durables; 
ability to save 
40% for single 
non-pensioner 
medium severity 
disability; 69% 
for pensioner 
Cullinan 
and 
colleagues 
(2011) 
Ireland: 1995–
2001 Living in 
Ireland Survey 
Household population; 
any chronic health 
problem 
Consumer 
durables; holiday 
44% for 
severely 
disabled; 
25% for 
pensioners  
Saunders 
(2007) 
Australia: 
1998/9 
Household 
Expenditure 
Survey 
Household population; 
Severity of activity 
restrictions 
Inverse of count of 
positive responses 
to series of 
hardship questions 
37% to 40-49% 
for the most 
severe  
She and 
Livermore 
(2007) 
US: 1996–99 
SIPP panel 
Age 25–61 at first 
interview. Condition that 
limits type or amount of 
work 
Ability to meet 
expenditures; 
material 
deprivation  
165% to 288% 
of poverty 
threshold 
income 
Loyalka, 
Liu, Chen 
and Zheng 
(2014) 
China: 2006 
National 
Survey of 
Disabled 
Persons 
Household population; 
medical impairments.  
Index of ownership 
of consumer 
durables 
31% for single 
adult household.  
Morciano, 
Hancok 
and Pudney 
(2015)  
UK: 2007/8 
Family 
Resources 
Survey   
Older people above the 
state pension age; Latent 
factor model for 
disability   
Ten indicators of 
ability to afford 
items or activities 
constructed into a 
latent index  
62% for an older 
adult with a 
median level of 
disability.  
Minh and 
Collegues 
(2015) 
Vietnam: 2011 
8 cities and 6 
provinces  
Household population; 
Functional impairments.  
Savings and index 
of household assets 
8 to 9.5% of 
annual 
household 
income 
Palmer, 
Williams, 
and 
Cambodia: 
2009–14 
Cambodian 
Socio-
Household population; 
Functioning 
impairments.  
Asset index 
combining durable 
goods and housing 
characteristics 
18% to 34% for 
households with 
at least one 
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McPake 
(2016)    
Economic 
Survey  
disabled 
member.  
 
 The theoretical relationship between standard of living, income and disability pertinent to 
the SOL approach is highlighted using Figure 1.  
<insert Figure 1 near here> 
As shown, the standard of living is assumed to rise with income for all households, but for 
a household with greater needs – for example, one containing a person with disabilities – the same 
income results in lower standard of living, as is shown by the shift to the bold line for a disabled 
person that is lower than the line for a non-disabled person. Conversely, the same standard of living 
can be achieved by a household with greater needs if it also has a higher income. Thus, in Figure 
1, income B for a disabled household translates into the same standard of living as income A for a 
non-disabled household, and B minus A gives an estimate of the extra costs of disability. The 
underlying econometric theory is that the latent variable S is measured by U, a sum index, for 
example, of the number of material deprivation indicators experienced by a household. 
Algebraically, the method can be stated as: 
<Equ> 
[1]                S = αY + βD + γX + k           
</Equ>                        
where S is an indicator of standard of living, Y is household income, D is disability status, X is a 
vector of other characteristics, including household composition, and k is the intercept term 
expressing a constant absolute minimum level of standard of living. Following equation [1], the 
extra costs of disability, E, is given by: 
 <Equ> 
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[2]                E =  dY / dD = -β / α             
</Equ> 
This can also be verified graphically. β gives the distance BC between the two lines in Figure 1, 
while α gives their slope, or BC over AB. Thus β / α = BC / (BC/AB) = AB, which is the extra 
cost of disability. Figure 1, and equation [1], illustrate the simple case where the extra costs of 
disability are independent of level of income, with a linear relationship between income and 
standard of living. However, it is possible that extra disability costs will rise with income, since 
those on higher incomes might require more than low-income households to maintain their 
standard of living. In other words, there are diminishing returns to income in terms of standard of 
living, as shown in Figure 2. In that case the Y, a component of equation [1] will be log income. 
The relationship between income and extra costs has important implications: the standard 
equivalisation for household size, for example, implies that an additional child costs more in a rich 
family than a poor one. By contrast, social security benefits for children, and for the extra costs of 
disability, are typically set at or near a flat rate, reflecting an assumption that extra costs are not 
related to income at all. 
<insert Figure 2 near here> 
<3>Disability-related decommodification  
One of the core purposes of the modern welfare state is to protect against the social risks 
associated with disability. Indeed, disability was one of the original ‘categories of need’ (Stone, 
1984) that societies developed to solve the problem who should be eligible for need-based aid 
and who must work to make ends meet (Stone, 1984); de Swann, 1988; Berkowitz, 1987). In The 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990, 37) formalized the concept of 
decommodification as a measure of the adequacy of the need-based aid provided by the welfare 
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state, which he defined as ‘the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially 
acceptable standard of living independently of market participation’.  To assess the capacity of 
welfare states to achieve decommodification, Esping-Andersen (1990) created an index that 
incorporated several indicators, including the benefit replacement rate, the duration required to 
receive a full benefit, and the share of the population covered by the benefit. With this index, a 
typology of three welfare state regimes was identified based on the level of achieved 
decommodification: a Liberal welfare state regime (Anglo-Saxon countries), a Conservative 
welfare state regime (mostly Central European countries), and a Social Democratic welfare state 
regime (mostly Nordic countries).1 
In the decades since The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism was published, welfare 
state regime analysis has extended to many other countries not included in the original analysis 
with the identification of additional regimes in East Asia, the Mediterranean, and post-Socialist 
countries, among others (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). The decommodification index has 
also been criticized along several dimensions. Feminist scholars have argued that the 
decommodification index overlooks the role of unpaid work and thus requires modification by 
including a broader definition of welfare state supports that accounts for the unpaid provision of 
care for dependent citizens (Orloff, 1996). Scholars of the so-called ‘new social risks’ have also 
argued for a broader view of welfare state effort. In response to the declining wages of low-
skilled workers that has occurred in the post-industrial economy, they argue that the welfare state 
should now include both decommodification and ‘recommodification’ as major goals (Taylor-
Gooby, 2004). Recommodification efforts include active labour market policies that seek to 
support the needs of workers by, for example, increasing wages or providing opportunities to re-
train or upskill.  
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A critique of the decommodification index can also be made taking the perspective of 
disabled people. The decommodification index of Esping-Andersen, in its assessment of the 
generosity of the benefit replacement rate, does not account for the challenges disabled people 
experience translating income replacements into a suitable standard of living. Thus, in order to 
evaluate the extent of disability-related decommodification achieved, one needs to assess the 
degree to which benefit programmes adequately compensate for the extra costs of disability. In 
addition, if we were to evaluate the success of recommodification efforts, we should also 
examine the extra costs that remain for a household with an adult member with work disabilities 
who is also working and whether their labour market participation reduces the extra costs of 
living. 
 
<3>Sensitivity of poverty estimates after accounting for the extra costs of disability  
As per one of our objectives, accounting for the extra costs of disability may further assist 
in developing more accurate poverty estimates that adjust for the fixed expenses required of 
those living with a disability. Health impairments that limit an adult’s ability to partake in 
employment can result in substantial financial repercussions. Schimmel and Stapleton (2012) 
find, for example, that older adults experiencing a work disability onset in the US experienced 
earnings 50 percent lower and poverty rates nearly double when compared to a matched 
comparison group who did not experience a disability onset. They further identify that various 
social welfare benefits, including unemployment and disability insurance, did little to offset this 
earnings decline. In 2018, about 29 percent of the EU population aged 16 or more with an 
activity limitation was at risk of poverty, compared with 19 percent of those with no limitations 
(Eurostat, 2019).2 Yet, as these figures do not equivalize for the extra costs of living with a 
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disability, they may undercount the true level of poverty. We thus further aim to demonstrate the 
sensitivity of poverty measures to the adjustment of the extra costs of disability.  
 
<2>Data  
We draw on data from the fifth wave of the Survey of Health Aging and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE), which was collected in 2013 and included additional questions on material 
deprivation that were not included in previous waves (Börsch-Supan, 2017). Since 2004, 
SHARE has provided an ex-ante harmonized cross-national and longitudinal panel dataset of 
older working-age adults across various European countries. The reference population of 
SHARE are adults age 50 and older residing in the territory of the country at the time of data 
collection. SHARE contains all the essential information required for the empirical work 
performed in this paper: net household disposable income, indicators of standard of living, 
multiple disability variables, and other personal attributes such as marital status, education, 
gender, and age. Because disability benefit programmes are designed for those who are still of 
working age and not receiving pensions, we restrict our analytic sample to those age 50 to 65 
years old. Though SHARE provides a longitudinal panel data, the current analysis is cross 
sectional and limited to wave 5. We further restrict the dataset to all observations without 
missing data. The final analytic sample consists of 19,793 respondents across 15 countries 
(Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Israel, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia).  
 
<3>The Standard of Living Indicators 
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The empirical work undertaken here is not aimed at specifying a model that could explain 
variation in standards of living overall. Rather, what is needed is to determine how income is 
related to a component of standard of living (i.e. to obtain an estimate of an income curve), and 
how disability reduces standard of living (i.e. by shifting the income curve to the right). Thus, the 
method adopted here relies heavily on the identification of a standard of living indicator that is 
affected by a switch towards disability-related extra consumption items.  
Several considerations come into play in the choice of standard-of-living indicator (see 
Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) for a discussion). The important ones are reiterated here. The 
relationship with income is important so that the indicator is sensitive to changes in available 
resources. The indicator should consist of goods and services preferences which are independent 
of disability status. There will also be other variations in preferences or tastes, but they will be 
‘averaged out’ in choosing a composite indicator that is based on a range of different items. 
Choosing an indicator which is sensitive to the bottom of the distribution means the results will 
reflect extra needs (necessities) but may not discriminate well for higher-income households. 
Choosing an indicator which is sensitive at the top of the distribution, on the other hand, means 
the results will reflect extra expenditure on non-essential items (e.g. luxuries). Again, a composite 
indicator will help to cover the full range.  
We experimented with several SOL indicators and decided on two. The first SOL 
indicator consists of a subjective assessment of the level of difficulty experienced by the 
household in making ends meet. For this question, respondents were asked to respond whether 
the household is able to make ends meet with great difficulty, with some difficulty, fairly easily, 
or easily. We refer to this indicator as SOL One. The second indicator is an index of material 
deprivation imputed by the SHARE survey team that uses 11 items and refers to two domains: 
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the failure in the affordability of basic needs and financial difficulties (see, Malter and Börsch-
Supan, 2015; Adena et al., 2015). We will refer to this indicator as SOL Two. Each of the 
indicators are outlined in Table A1. Questions used in the index of SOL Two include the 
inability to afford groceries, meet unexpected expenses, afford to heat your home, and 
postponing visits to the doctor and dentist to reduce costs. Scores on the index vary from 0 to 1 
with the higher the score the greater the material deprivation experienced.  
<3>The disability variable 
There is little consensus as to the best way to identify disability in cross-national policy 
research. There is no single definition that is universally accepted to cover all its aspects and 
severity (Burchardt, 2014). We thus experiment with three indicators of disability. The first 
consists of whether the respondent said ‘yes’ to whether they have a health problem that limits 
paid work. This is a frequently used indicator of work-disability in large public surveys 
(Burkhauser et al., 2002). As a second disability variable, we use a question in the SHARE data 
that is made specific to each country surveyed and that identifies those who are receiving public 
disability benefits (Börsch-Supan et al., 2009). This disability benefit variable is important since 
it provides us with an indirect measurement of the decommodifying effects of the disability 
benefits provided. Insofar as disability benefits truly decommodify, we would expect to see little 
to no extra costs of living among those receiving these benefits.  
Rates of work-disability and disability benefit receipt have been shown to vary widely 
cross-nationally and as a result of both individual level (i.e. health differences) and country level 
(i.e. different disability policies, welfare states, and labour market factors) factors (Börsch-Supan 
et al., 2009; Benitez-Silva et al., 2010; Kapteyn et al., 2007; Burkhauser et al., 2014). To identify 
a more universal measure of disability and to compare the effects of different degrees of 
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disablement, we construct a latent health index that was developed and validated by Poterba et al. 
(2013). The index consists of a composite measure of health that divides the population into 
quintiles of lesser and poorer health. The composite measure is compiled using a principal 
component analysis from 19 different measures of health. Table A2 provides the variables and the 
first principal component factors scores used in the analysis. The first principal component is the 
weighted average of the 19 health indicators and is used to maximize the share of the variance of 
the individual health indicators across the population in question. Using the coefficients from the 
first principal component, each individual in the dataset is assigned a raw health score. These raw 
scores are then divided into quintiles that provide a national population level health ranking with 
those in the fifth quintiles in the worst health and those in the first quintiles in the best health. The 
health score also points to the disability severity experienced by the individuals. 
<3>Income and control variables  
We use an imputed net income variable which aggregates at the household level all sources 
of income (see De Luca et al., 2015). Importantly, it provides a measure of post-transfer income 
that includes all moneys received from welfare state transfers, such as disability insurance benefits 
or any other extra costs of living benefits. The control variables tested were determined by our 
hypotheses about their importance in the relationship between standard of living, income and 
disability. For instance, housing ownership is included since it is expected that homeowners and 
tenants with the same level of income, measured before housing costs, will have different standards 
of living. Similarly, country dummies are included to control, at least partly, for geographical 
differences in costs of living. Marital status, number of children and education status are other 
important control variables found to be significant in our specification search. The inclusion of 
explanatory variables reported for the final specification of the models was determined at the end 
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by their statistical significance. The model is not designed to capture all explanatory factors for 
the standard of living equation.  
<2>Results  
<3>Pooled Estimation Results  
We begin by providing our estimates that are pooled across the 15 countries in Table 2. 
Results are reported for two indicators of standard of living: respondent’s self-assessment of the 
level of difficulty experienced by the household in making ends meet (SOL One), and the material 
deprivation index (SOL Two). For SOL One, the dependent variable is a categorical variable that 
is defined in an ordered way. We thus make use of the ordered logistic regression to estimate the 
regression equation. For SOL Two, the material deprivation index is a continuous variable, so we 
use the OLS regression. A range of income specifications were explored, including linear and non-
linear terms and interaction terms. A log income specification was found to provide the best fit, 
thus confirming our a priori hypothesis that the marginal returns of income to standard of living 
decrease as income rises. In other words, an additional €1 makes more difference to the standard 
of living of a poor person than a rich person. The adjusted R-squared statistics – a measure of the 
explanatory power of the models – while not high, are reasonable for cross-sectional analysis of 
this kind. 
All estimates of extra costs are shown in the top rows of the table and are expressed as the 
percentage of income by which costs increase for households with a member with disabilities. The 
extra costs estimates are derived from the ratio of coefficients on disability and income, as shown 
by equation [2]. For instance, looking at Table 2, using the ‘ability to make ends meet’ indicator 
of standard of living (SOL One) and the work-disability variable, the ratio of coefficient for 
disability (-0.301) and coefficient for log income (0.682) provides the estimate that this group 
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requires about 44 percent more income to maintain their living standards for a person with 
disabilities in the household. These results for the work-disability indicator range from 44 to 62 
percent for all households for SOL One and SOL Two, respectively, and are similar to past 
estimates in the advanced economic countries as shown in Table 1.  
The results broken down by household type further reveal that single working-age adults 
with work-disabilities face substantially larger extra costs associated with their disability compared 
to married or partnered households. One of the reasons is presumably that they do not have help 
from their family members either in the provision of care or as a source of supplemental household 
income. Reliant on a single source of household income, the single individual with a work-
disability must receive substantially more income (55 percent SOL One and 93 percent for SOL 
Two) to maintain a living standard comparable to a single household without a disability. The 
results for disability benefit recipients follow a similar pattern, though the extra costs estimates are 
considerably lower than for those reporting work-disabilities. For example, on average for all 
households across the 15 countries, we estimate that a disability benefit recipient must receive 30 
percent more income than a person not receiving disability benefits to make ends meet (SOL One) 
and 40 percent more income to maintain a living standard in accordance with the material 
deprivation index (SOL Two). We can assume that the estimates for disability benefit recipients 
are lower than for those who are work-disabled due to the fact that these individuals are receiving 
a partial compensation on account for their disabilities. Nevertheless, the extra costs estimate for 
disability benefit recipients indicate that disability benefit recipients maintain considerable extra 
costs of living and are not fully deccomodified as a result of the benefits they receive. 
Table 2 further provides estimates of the extra costs of disability for those who are in 
work. In recent decades, there has been well identified international expansion of active labour 
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market policies designed to promote recommodification by assisting those historically reliant on 
income replacement programmes to return to employment (Gilbert, 2002), including many with 
disabilities (OECD, 2010; Böheim and Leoni, 2017). These measures include, among 
others, increasing the incentives for employers to integrate their employees with disabilities, 
providing increased access to vocational rehabilitation and work incentives for beneficiaries to 
work.  
On average and across the 15 countries in our dataset, 23 percent of those receiving 
disability benefits report being employed and 33 percent of those reporting work-disabilities 
report being employed. Among those who are working, we find that a person with a work 
disability must receive 32 percent more income than a person not with a work disability to make 
ends meet (the SOL one indicator of standard of living). We further identify that, among those 
working, disability benefit recipients who combine work and benefit receipt report about half as 
much extra costs of living at 15 percent (for SOL one indicator). The results for SOL two 
indicator are slightly higher but they also show that the extra costs of living are lowest for those 
who are in work, especially for those who also receive disability benefits. This may be 
attributable to differences in disability severity among those beneficiaries who are able to work. 
It may also suggest that recommodification efforts that encourage labour market participation 
among those with work disabilities or that allow for the combination of market income and 
benefit receipt may be particularly helpful in reducing the extra costs of disability.  
<insert Table 2 near here> 
<Table head>Table 2: Extra costs of living estimates for two disability definitions and two SOL 
indicators by household type 
Disability definition Work-disability Disability Benefits 
SOL indicator  One Two One Two 
Extra costs estimate (All) -44% -62% -30% -40% 
Extra costs estimate (Married/Partnered) -45% -58% -30% -36% 
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Extra costs estimate (Single person) -55% -93% -37% -57% 
Extra costs estimate (Working) -32% -47% -15% -22% 
All Households      
Income (log) 0.682 -0.281 0.702 -0.294 
Work-disability -0.301 0.173   
Disability Benefits   -0.210 0.116 
Observations 22,990 22,990 22,990 22,990 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.317 0.146 0.302 
Married/Partnered      
Income (log) 0.634 -0.272 0.648 -0.281 
Work-disability -0.286 0.157   
Disability Benefits   -0.192 0.101 
Observations 16,945 16,945 16,945 16,945 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.151 0.302 0.147 0.289 
Single      
Income (log) 0.610 -0.226 0.648 -0.251 
Work-disability -0.338 0.210   
Disability Benefits   -0.237 0.142 
Observations 6,045 6,045 6,045 6,045 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.308 0.127 0.286 
Working      
Income (log) 0.650 -0.238 0.656 -0.242 
Work-disability -0.205 0.112   
Disability Benefits   -0.097 0.053 
Observations 12994 12994 12994 12994 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.137 0.139 0.134 0.140 
Note: Standardized beta coefficients. All models control for age, secondary education, number of 
children, home ownership, and country dummies, whose coefficients are not included here for the 
sake of brevity. Full results provided in Tables A3, A4, A5, and A6 in the appendix.  
 
In Table 3, we provide the extra costs of living estimates according to the latent health 
quintiles and thus are able to examine whether the extra costs of disability vary by the severity of 
an individual’s health condition. As expected from past research, the extra costs of living with 
disability are shown to increase as people have more severe impairments with those in poorest 
health or in the fifth quintile requiring nearly 60 percent more income than those in the first health 
quintile to achieve a suitable standard of living. The results for SOL Two, the material deprivation 
index, reveal a similar linear severity trend and is in accordance with the results presented above 
in being larger than the estimates for SOL One.  
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<Insert Table 3 near here> 
<Table head>Table 3: Extra costs of disability estimates by health severity and two SOL indicator 
  SOL One  SOL Two  
  
Standardized 
beta coef.  
Extra costs 
estimate (%)  
Standardized 
beta coef.  
Extra costs 
estimate 
Income (log) 0.681   -0.278   
1st health quintile 
(the best health) 
        
2nd health quintile -0.056 -8% 0.030 -11% 
3rd health quintile -0.110 -16% 0.050 -18% 
4th health quintile -0.251 -37% 0.120 -43% 
5th health quintile -0.405 -59% 0.241 -87% 
Note: Calculations are based on the SOL estimation approach used in Table 2 but with the health 
quintile variable derived from the principal component analysis. Both models control for age, 
secondary education, number of children, and home ownership, and country dummies. Full 
results provided in Table A7.  
 
<3>Extra cost estimates by country and across welfare state regime  
The results presented thus far are for the pooled sample across countries, with country 
dummies included as control variables. This constrains the estimated relationship between 
income, disability and standard of living to be the same across countries. Next, we relax this 
assumption by modelling each country separately and provide estimation of the extra costs of 
disability in 15 advanced economic countries using the more conservative SOL One variable 
(namely, self-assessment on household’s ability to make ends meet) in Table 4. We provide our 
results for each of the individual countries for SOL Two and by welfare regime for SOL Two in 
the appendix Tables A8 and A9.  
<Insert Table 4 near here> 
<Table head>Table 4: Extra disability costs estimate by country (SOL One) 
           
Work disabled 
 (%) 
Receives disability benefit 
(%) N  
Austria -53 -23           1,503  
Germany -28 -15           2,462  
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Sweden -74 -76           1,323  
Netherlands -60 -45           1,491  
Spain -49 -34           1,970  
Italy -33 -25           1,502  
France -30 -10           1,715  
Denmark -49 -27           1,756  
Switzerland  -44 -45           1,162  
Belgium -63 -53           2,392  
Israel -35 -34              385  
Czech Republic -57 -27           1,551  
Luxembourg -30 -27              770  
Slovenia -46 -36           1,117  
Estonia -71 -42           1,891  
Note: Calculations are based on the approach used in Table 2 for each country separately using 
SOL One. All models control for age, secondary education, number of children, and home 
ownership.  
 
It is interesting to note here that, though we are missing countries from the liberal welfare 
regimes, such as the US or UK, our cross-country results do not appear to follow the three 
worlds cluster of Esping-Andersen (1990). In Sweden, for example, where substantial disability 
benefit reforms have occurred in recent years (Burkhauser et al., 2014) and which is considered a 
highly decommodifying social democratic welfare state regime, our estimates suggest the 
disability benefit recipients require approximately 76 percent more income to maintain their 
living standards. Disability benefit recipients in France (10%) and Germany (15%) appear to 
require less income to make ends meet than benefit recipients in the other Conservative regimes, 
including Belgium (53%), the Netherlands (45%), Luxembourg (27%) and, to a lesser extent, 
Austria (23%).  
The southern European countries of Spain (34%) and Italy (25%) have fairly low extra 
costs of living estimates for benefit recipients, while disability benefit recipients in the post-
socialist countries of Estonia (42%), Slovenia (36%), and the Czech Republic (27%) have 
somewhat higher estimates. In accordance with the results above, the extra costs estimate for 
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those on disability benefits are, in all but two countries, less than the estimates of the extra costs 
estimates for those with a work-disability. As noted above, this discrepancy is likely attributable 
to the receipt of income replacements. As indicated in the country specific estimates, Table 5 
further shows that the extra costs estimates are higher in the Eastern European and Social 
Democratic welfare state regimes than in the Conservative and Mediterranean welfare state 
regimes.  
<Insert Table 5 near here> 
<Table head>Table 5: Extra disability costs estimate by welfare state regime (SOL One) 
    
Extra cost 
estimate 
Income (log) Disability Observations 
Social 
Democratic 
Work-Disabled -62% 0.699 -0.431 3079 
Disability 
Benefit 
-52% 0.723 -0.377 3079 
Conservative 
Work-Disabled -40% 0.785 -0.314 11495 
Disability 
Benefit 
-28% 0.807 -0.227 11495 
Mediterranean 
Work-Disabled -41% 0.601 -0.248 3857 
Disability 
Benefit 
-31% 0.612 -0.189 3857 
Eastern 
European 
Work-Disabled -66% 0.545 -0.358 4559 
Disability 
Benefit 
-38% 0.562 -0.215 4559 
Note: Calculations are based on the approach used in Table 2 for each country separately using 
SOL One. All models control for age, secondary education, number of children, and home 
ownership. The welfare state regimes used are Social Democratic (Sweden and Denmark); 
Conservative Regimes (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg); Mediterranean regimes (Spain, Italy, Israel, and France); Eastern European 
welfare state regimes (Estonia, and Slovenia). Israel is considered a Mediterranean regime as 
following Gal (2010).  
 
Böheim and Leoni (2017), building from a typology of the ‘three worlds of disability 
policy’ recognised by the OECD (2010), identify three country clusters of disability policy 
regimes that closely align with the welfare regimes of Esping-Andersen (1990). The first cluster 
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is the ‘Nordic’ or ‘Social-democratic’ cluster consisting of Germany, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, that combines heavy investment in integration 
measures with generous compensation levels. The second ‘residual’ cluster includes countries 
with moderate integration and compensation levels and a greater emphasis on occupational status 
in the assessment of benefit eligibility. These include Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and Poland. The third ‘liberal’ cluster is composed of countries with low 
compensation levels but higher employment integration efforts, including Australia, Canada, 
Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States. Our analyses are selective since we lack data 
for all the countries, particularly the liberal cluster. We can nonetheless draw the insights that: 
(a) the generous social democratic regimes do not directly translate into a lower extra costs of 
disability estimate; (b) there is considerable internal variation of the extra cost estimates within 
the various welfare state and disability policy regime types, such as those between Sweden (-
74%) and Denmark (-49%), the Netherlands (-60%) and Germany (-28%), and Slovenia (-46%) 
and Estonia (-71%); and (c) the Eastern European countries of Slovenia and Estonia also have 
higher extra cost estimates suggesting that future research should investigate treating these 
countries as a separate disability policy regime. Largely for these mixed results for each welfare 
and disability policy regime types, we resist undertaking any further analysis on the basis of the 
regime clustering. 
While we do not endeavour to explain all the differences here, we can hypothesize as to 
the major drivers of the identified variation across countries and regimes.  
<BL> 
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• A first hypothesis concerns the varying degrees of social security entitlements and tax reliefs 
for people with disabilities and their caregivers. In countries with more generous disability 
supports, one would suspect there to be fewer extra costs of living.  
• A second hypothesis concerns the impact of other policy domains outside of a country’s 
disability policies. For example, individuals in countries with less generous healthcare 
systems, limited public transportation options and reduced access to low-cost caregiving 
services may also have greater disability related expenses. 
• A third hypothesis, perhaps helpful in explaining the high estimate for Social Democratic 
countries and, specifically Sweden, concerns the diminishing returns to income hypothesis by 
which the extra costs of disability will be high in richer countries as more income would be 
necessary to maintain a suitably higher standard of living despite disability. This hypothesis 
would also be consistent with the finding of lower extra costs of living identified in 
developing countries as identified in the literature (see, Table 1).  
• A fourth hypothesis concerns the role of the voluntary sector and the informal provision of 
care. In some welfare state regimes, the role of the formal voluntary sector may be important, 
while in others the informal care provided by non-household members may be more 
significant, and these factors may also help to explain the variations in the costs of living 
associated with disability. In the Mediterranean welfare state regime, for example, the family 
is known to play a large role in the provision of care and support, which may contribute to 
the low extra cost estimates identified (Moreno-Fuentes and Marí-Klose, 2016).  
<BL> 
<3>Implications of extra costs of disability on poverty risks  
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We next examine how the poverty risks of people with disability are affected when we 
also account for differences in the costs of living between households with and without disabled 
adult members. Our objective here is to show the sensitivity of accounting for the extra disability 
costs rather than making a judgement on poverty levels per se in the countries in question. We 
choose to define poverty as consistent with the Eurostat’s measure of at-risk-of poverty (the so-
called AROP measure widely used in the European countries), but the individual countries may 
measure national levels of poverty in different ways. The rationale underlying this sensitivity test 
is that the adjustment in differences across households that accounts for the extra costs of 
disability are an improvement over conventional correction for household size and composition 
only while carrying out interpersonal comparison of economic resources and needs across people 
of different attributes.  
Results reported in Table 6 make use of the extra costs estimates for those with work-
disability in each country derived from Table 4. To adjust poverty metrics for the extra costs of 
living with a disability, we first generate a weighted median income score by country. We then 
identify an unadjusted rate of poverty by identifying individuals with incomes less than 60 percent 
below the median income in their respective country. To provide an adjusted score of the poverty 
rate, we generate the lost income that is due to work-disability using these estimates and create a 
new net income variable that is adjusted for the lost income. We then regenerate the poverty 
indicator (less than 60 percent below median income) using the adjusted net income variable. The 
results in Table 6 demonstrate how the poverty risks change for those with work-disabilities and 
for the population aged 50–65 when we account for the additional costs that arise due to 
disabilities. A considerably greater proportion of persons with disabilities are categorized as at risk 
of poverty after the disability costs adjustment. On average, the poverty rate for an older working-
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age adult with a work-disability is nearly twice as high (43 percent for the unadjusted rate as 
opposed to 68 percent for the adjusted rate). The poverty risks for the population aged 50–65 are 
also higher for all countries after adjusting for the extra costs of disability and range from a 2-
percentage point increase in Italy to a 16-percentage point increase in Estonia.  
<Insert Table 6 near here> 
<Table head>Table 6: Unadjusted and adjusted poverty rates for people with disabilities age 50–
65 
 
Poverty rate 
for 
respondents 
with no 
disabilities 
(%) 
Unadjusted 
poverty rate 
for 
respondents 
with 
disabilities 
(%) 
Adjusted 
poverty rate 
for 
respondents 
with 
disability 
(%) 
Un-
adjusted 
poverty rate 
for total 
pop. 50–65 
(%) 
Adjusted 
poverty rate 
for total 
pop 50–65 
(%) 
Austria 21 41 79 25 32 
Germany 22 46 59 29 33 
Sweden 27 43 99 30 41 
Netherlands 24 44 82 28 37 
Spain 23 29 76 24 33 
Italy 21 39 62 23 25 
France 24 47 64 28 32 
Denmark 19 40 82 25 36 
Switzerland  25 47 75 28 32 
Belgium 24 42 86 28 36 
Israel 30 54 73 35 38 
Czech Republic 21 40 91 25 38 
Luxembourg 27 45 61 31 34 
Slovenia 30 32 59 31 34 
Estonia 25 42 92 31 47 
Total sample  23 43 68 27 32 
Notes: All results are weighted using calibrated weights. Poverty is defined as below 60 percent 
of median income threshold in the specific country of residence.  
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<2>Conclusions 
The analysis followed the SOL approach to quantifying the extra costs experienced by 
people with disabilities across 15 European countries, following the approach of Zaidi and 
Burchardt (2005, 2009). This approach recognizes that given a fixed amount of income households 
with people with disabilities cannot achieve the same standard of living as households without 
disabled persons. We propose that this indirect measurement technique serves as an additional 
indicator of disability-related decommodification in the welfare state. Insofar as disability benefit 
programmes decommodify their benefit recipients, we would expect to see little to no extra costs 
of living among persons receiving these benefits. However, our estimates indicate that disability 
benefit recipients require substantial additional income in order to achieve their standard of living. 
This finding has strong implications for analysing the adequacy of social welfare programmes 
targeting people with disabilities.  
The paper further highlighted that there is heterogeneity among types of households, 
employment status, and across levels of disability severity that is important in determining costs 
of living for a household with a disability relative to a typical family. Thus, if income of a single 
adult with a disability is gauged relative to a poverty threshold without making an adjustment to 
either their income or the standard, poverty among this subgroup will be understated. Moreover, 
we identified that those with disabilities who engage in work, on average, have lower extra cost 
estimates and that those who combine disability benefits with work have about half as much extra 
costs of living, which suggests the benefits of creating opportunities for benefit recipients to 
combine market income with benefit receipts.  
We further observed differences in the extent of achieved decommodification across 
individual countries and welfare state regimes. Our results were somewhat counterintuitive and in 
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conflict with the ranking of welfare states identified by Esping-Andersen (1990), as we find 
particularly large estimates of the extra costs of living in the social democratic welfare state regime. 
We provided hypotheses for explaining these results, which should be explored further in the future 
work. Finally, the results obtained show the feasibility of deriving an equivalence scale to account 
for differences in disability status across households for the advanced economic countries. The 
results are drawn from the SHARE dataset and are the first to calculate and compare the extra costs 
of disability using ex ante harmonized survey data across countries. The important finding, which 
confirms the insights drawn from previous studies, is that the extra costs of disability are 
substantial in all countries studied with considerable variations identified among different 
household types, with individuals with more severe disability conditions and across countries.  
We also examined how the poverty risks of people with disability are affected when we 
account for differences in the costs of living between households with and without disabled adult 
members. The rationale underlying this sensitivity test is that the interpersonal comparison of 
economic resources and needs must also account for differences in disability costs. Our results 
show that, by ‘equivalizing’ household incomes which account for sources of variation in 
households’ needs arising due to disability, the poverty risks for people with disabilities are 
substantially higher. The impact of this adjustment is not only on the relative position of disabled 
and non-disabled people in the income distribution, but also on the estimated poverty risks for the 
overall population. This information on the extra costs that people with disabilities encounter 
across the advanced economic countries can be useful for policy makers to better understand the 
limitations of current disability support programmes at providing people with disabilities with a 
decent standard of living.  
<2>Notes 
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<Take in notes and endnotes here>
<2>References 
Adena, M., Myck, M. and Oczkowska, M. (2015) ‘Material deprivation items in SHARE Wave 5 
data: a contribution to a better understanding of differences in material conditions in later 
life’, in A. Börsch-Supan, T. Kneip, H. Litwin, M. Myck and G. Weber (eds) Ageing in 
Europe: Supporting Policies for an Inclusive Society. Berlin: De Gruyter.  
Benitez-Silva, H., Disney, R. and Jiménez-Martín, S. (2010) ‘Disability, capacity for work and 
the business cycle: an international perspective’, Economic Policy 25(63): 483–536. 
Berkowitz, E. (1987) Disabled Policy: America’s Policy for the Handicapped, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Berthoud, R. (1991) ‘Meeting the costs of disability’, in G. Dalley (ed.) Disability and Social 
Policy, London: Policy Studies Institute. 
Berthoud, R., Blekesaune, M. and R. Hancock, (1993) ‘Ageing, income and living standards: 
evidence from the British Household Panel Survey’, Ageing and Society 29(7): 1105. 
Böheim, R. and Leoni, T. (2017) ‘Sickness and disability policies: Reform paths in OECD 
countries between 1990 and 2014’, International Journal of Social Welfare 27(2): 168–
185. 
Börsch-Supan, A. (2017) Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) Wave 5. 
Release version: 6.0.0. SHARE-ERIC. Data set.  
Börsch-Supan, A., Brugiavini, A. and Croda, E. (2009) ‘The role of institutions and health in 
European patterns of work and retirement’, Journal of European Social Policy 19(4): 
341–358 
             
2 
Braithwaite, J. and Mont, D. (2009) ‘Disability and poverty: a survey of World Bank poverty 
assessments and implications’, ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 3(3): 
219–232.  
Burchardt, T. (2004) ‘Capabilities and disability: the capabilities framework and the social model 
of disability’, Disability and Society 19(7), 735–751. 
Burkhauser, R., Daly, M., Houtenville, A. and Nargis, N. (2002) ‘Self-reported work-limitation 
data: what they can and cannot tell us’, Demography 39(3): 541–555. 
Burkhauser, R., Daly, M., McVicar, D. and Wilkins, R. (2014) ‘Disability benefit growth and 
disability reform in the US: lessons from other OECD nations’, IZA Journal of Labor 
Policy 3(1): 4. 
Cullinan, J., Gannon, B. and Lyons, S. (2011) ‘Estimating the extra cost of living for people with 
disabilities’, Health Economics 20(5): 582–599. 
De Luca, G., Rossetti, C. and Malter, F. (2015) ‘Sample design and weighting strategies in 
SHARE Wave 5’, in F. Malter and A. Börsch‐Supan (eds) SHARE Wave 5: Innovations 
& methodology, Munich: Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing at the Max Planck 
Institute for Social Law and Social Policy. 
De Swann, A. (1988) In Care of the State: Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and 
the USA in the Modern Era, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Eurostat (2019, October 28) Disability statistics – poverty and income quintiles. Retrieved from  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/34425.pdf 
Ferragina, E. and Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2011) ‘Thematic review. Welfare regime debate: past, 
present, futures?’, Policy & Politics 39(4): 583–611. 
             
3 
Gal, J. (2010) ‘Is there an extended family of Mediterranean welfare states?’, Journal of 
European Social Policy 20(4): 283–300. 
Gilbert, N. (2002) Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public 
Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Goodin, R.E., Heady, B., Muffels, R. and Dirven, H.-J. (1999) The Real Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kapteyn, A., Smith, J.P. and Van Soest, A. (2007) ‘Vignettes and self-reports of work disability 
in the United States and the Netherlands’, American Economic Review 97(1): 461–473. 
Loyalka, P., Liu, L., Chen, G. and Zheng, X. (2014) ‘The cost of disability in 
China’, Demography 51(1): 97–118. 
Malter, F. and Börsch‐Supan, A. (eds) (2015) SHARE Wave 5: Innovations & methodology, 
Munich: Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing at the Max Planck Institute for 
Social Law and Social Policy. 
Minh, H., Giang, K., Liem, T., Palmer, M., Thao, N. and Duong, L. (2015) ‘Estimating the extra 
cost of living with disability in Vietnam’, Global Public Health 10(1): S70–S79. 
Mitra, S., Palmer, M., Kim, H., Mont, D. and Groce, N. (2017) ‘Extra costs of living with a 
disability: a review and agenda for research’, Disability and Health Journal 10(4): 475–
484. 
Morciano, M., Hancock, R. and Pudney, S. (2015) ‘Disability costs and equivalence scales in the 
older population in Great Britain’, Review of Income and Wealth 61(3): 494–514. 
Moreno-Fuentes, F. and Marí-Klose, P. (eds) (2016) The Mediterranean Welfare Regime and the 
Economic Crisis, Abingdon: Routledge. 
             
4 
Newacheck, P., Inkelas, M. and Kim, S. (2004) ‘Health services use and health care expenditures 
for children with disabilities’, Pediatrics 14: 79–85 
OECD (2010) Sickness, Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers: A Synthesis of Findings 
across OECD Countries, Paris: Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
Orloff, A. (1996) ‘Gender in the welfare state’, Annual Review of Sociology 22(1): 51–78. 
Palmer, M., Williams, J. and McPake, B. (2016) The Cost of Disability in a Low-income 
Country. Working Paper. Victoria, Australia.   
Poterba, J., Venti, S. and Wise, D. (2013) ‘Health, education, and the postretirement evolution of 
household assets’, Journal of Human Capital 7(4): 297–339. 
Saunders, P. (2007) ‘The costs of disability and the incidence of poverty’, Australian Journal of 
Social Issues 42(4): 461–480. 
Schimmel, J. and Stapleton, D.  (2012) ‘The financial repercussions of new work-limiting health 
conditions for older workers’, INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organization, 
Provision, and Financing 49(2), 141–163. 
Scruggs, L. and Allan, J. (2006) ‘Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: a 
replication and revision’, Journal of European Social Policy 16(1): 55–72. 
She, P. and Livermore, G. (2007) ‘Material hardship, poverty and disability among working-age 
adults’, Social Science Quarterly 88(4): 970–989. 
Stapleton, D., Protik, A. and Stone, C. (2008) Review of International Evidence on the Cost of 
Disability, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report no. 542, London: 
Department for Work and Pensions. 
Stone, D. (1984) The Disabled State, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
             
5 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) ‘New social risks and welfare states: New paradigm and new politics?’, 
in Taylor-Gooby, P. (ed)  New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European 
Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Wilkinson-Meyers, L., Brown, P., McNeill, R., Patston, P., Dylan, S. and Baker, R. (2010) 
‘Estimating the additional cost of disability: beyond budget standards’, Social Science 
and Medicine 71: 1882–1889. 
Zaidi, A. and Burchardt, T. (2005) ‘Comparing incomes when needs differ: equivalisation for the 
extra costs of disability’, Review of Income and Wealth 51(1): 89–114. 
Zaidi, A. and T. Burchardt (2009) ‘Estimating the extra costs of living for disabled people in EU 
Member States’, Paper presented at the 2009 ODI Evidence Day, London: Department 
for Work and Pensions. 
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HARE.w4.600, 10.6103/SHARE.w5.600, 10.6103/SHARE.w6.600), see Börsch-Supan et al. 
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sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org). 
1 The Social Democratic regimes were shown to be the most decommodifying and the Liberal welfare regimes the 
least with the Conservative regimes in between. A stratification index was also developed to identify the typologies, 
which concerned the way social policies can influence social inequities and the general order of social relations 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
2 The at-risk-of poverty rate as calculated by Eurostat consists of the share of people with an equivalized (by 
household size) disposable income (after social transfers) below the poverty threshold of 60 percent of the national 
median income.  
 
